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NOTES
TREATING THE PEN AND THE SWORD AS
CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALS: HOW AND WHY THE
SUPREME COURT SHOULD APPLY ITS FIRST AMENDMENT
EXPERTISE TO THE GREAT SECOND AMENDMENT
DEBATE
INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment has received probably more treatment from
both the courts and the legal academy than any other amendment.
The Second Amendment, by contrast, has received virtually no
consideration in the courts and scant attention from legal scholars
up until roughly the last fifteen years.1 "[Wihat was true of the First
Amendment as of 1904 remains true of the Second Amendment even
now. "' Professor Sanford Levinson suggests that legal academics'
failure to address Second Amendment issues stems from a
legitimate fear of the legal conclusions that might be reached if the
amendment were given greater, and intellectually honest, attention
by courts and legal scholars.' Perhaps it is time to give the Second
Amendment a dose of First Amendment analysis.
Although a few modern scholars have drawn parallels between
the First and Second Amendments4 along with at least one during
1. See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989)
(describing the lack of scholarship on the Second Amendment, its sparse appearances in
leading casebooks, and the very limited case law in the area).
2. William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43
DUKE L.J. 1236, 1239 (1994).
3. Levinson, supra note 1, at 642.
4. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Words, and Constitutional Interpretation, 38 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1311 (1997); see also Sanford Levinson, The Right to BearArms, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, May 1, 1991, at 13.
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the nineteenth century,5 practical applications of these parallels
have yet to be described in any comprehensive detail. Given that the
United States now has more than 20,000 firearms laws (including
federal, state, and local laws),6 such a practical application seems
long overdue. Much of the existing scholarship that addresses the
meaning of the Second Amendment examines the Amendment from
a single perspective, as though in a vacuum. Some focus on textual
analysis,7 others on "original meaning" (the Framers' understanding
and historical context);8 few, however, view the Amendment through
analyses that are more applicable to, and derived from, modem
times and current legal standards. As one scholar points out,
"Second Amendment scholars feel most comfortable discussing
history. They claim that the Amendment's history is known and
that it freezes the Amendment's meaning. To the best of my
knowledge, no First Amendment scholar believes that the First
Amendment's history is dispositive of its meaning."' Nor should the
Second Amendment's history be dispositive of, or limit, its meaning
today.
Setting aside the many possible explanations for the disparate
treatment of the First and Second Amendments, it is clear that
technological advances since their ratification in 1791 have re-
sulted in a great deal of development and evolution of the law with
respect to freedom of speech and freedom of the press, particularly
in the twentieth century, while the right to keep and bear arms
has languished as a nebulous concept, despite our current age of
5. JOHN NORTON DOMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 239 (1868) ("The (Second Amendment] is analogous to the one securing
freedom of speech and of the press. Freedom, not license, is secured; the Fair Use not the
libelous abuse, is protected.").
6. See Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 110 (1987); see also Pending Firearms Legislation and the
Administration's Enforcement of Current Gun Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 158-79 (1999) (statement of John R. Lott,
Jr.) (discussing the large number of firearm regulations).
7. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv.
793(1998).
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984).
9. Powe, supra note 4, at 1340-41 (footnote omitted).
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automatic firearms and aircraft carriers."0 Although the Supreme
Court and the legal commentators have written about and debated
the implications of technology with respect to the rights of free
speech and press, they have all but ignored as a matter of consti-
tutional law the technological developments since 1791 in the field
of firearms.11
The Court and the legal academy can and should apply much of
what has been learned and established in the realms of free speech
and free press to the Second Amendment. Although the First and
Second Amendments are different in both construction and purpose,
the well-established standards and tests applicable to the regulation
of speech and press are valuable tools with which to understand
the practical aspects of firearms regulation vis-A-vis the Second
Amendment.
This Note will assume that the Second Amendment, as a "right of
the people," is an individual right, and argue from that perspective
that standards of review analogous to those applied to the First
Amendment (which, in contrast, is a restraint on Congress) can and
should be applied to cases involving the right to keep and bear
arms. Applying the so-called "standard model,"12 this Note will
10. Prominent free speech and free press decisions arising from technological
developments include Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down portions of Congress'
attempt to regulate the Internet via the Communications Decency Act), and Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment applies to
radio broadcasters, but that the medium, by its nature, must be subject to different standards
than other media).
11. Advocates both within and outside of the legal profession have made the point that
we cannot leave Second Amendment law lingering in the age of muskets while acknowledging
the changing times with respect to the First Amendment. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, All
Amendments Were Created Equal, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., Apr. 25, 1998, at 6, available at WL
42/25/98 CHIDLB 6.
12. The "standard model" posits that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual
right to keep and bear arms and was intended to preserve the might of "the people" vis.-vis
an always potentially tyrannical government. See infra Part I.A. For further discussion and
an overview of the "standard model," see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the
Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995). The idea of a "standard model" of the
Second Amendment probably began with Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983), and has developed
into a substantial body of literature that is still growing. The "collective rights" interpretation
views the Second Amendment as a means for states to maintain militias in order deter abuses
by the federal government. See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigam, The Second
Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 5 (1989).
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explore some practical limits on the government's power to regulate
firearms under the Second Amendment by using basic and widely
understood First Amendment standards and examples to illuminate
the unconstitutionality of recent legislation regulating firearms,
including the National Firearms Act of 1934"s and the federal
"assault weapons" ban.14
I. REASONS TO APPLY FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS TO THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
A. Construction of the Amendments: Rights of "The People"
The First and Second Amendments differ in both their con-
struction and in the nature of the rights that they secure; it seems
that the text of the Second supports a more expansive reading than
that given to the First. 5 Despite (or perhaps because of) these
differences, legal scholars and philosophers have recently started to
wonder
what justifies giving the Second Amendment a narrow
construction at the same time one gives an expansive
interpretation to the First?... [The] text cannot help, since both
amendments are equally susceptible to either narrow or broad
constructions. Reliance on precedent also cannot solve the
problem since the narrow interpretation of the Second
Amendment is not so settled by a series of Supreme Court
decisions that it could not be revisited.1
6
One plausible approach is to apply analogous First Amendment
standards to Second Amendment issues. This approach would
13. National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 5801-5850 (2000)) (providing for registration, taxation, and other regulation of fully
automatic firearms, short-barreled shotguns and rifles, and other "destructive devices").
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 (2000) (prohibiting, inter alia, the manufacture and import of so-
called "assault weapons," defined in this law as semiautomatic firearms with two or more
defined features such as bayonet mounts and folding stocks). The assault weapons ban was
passed as part of the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
15. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
16. Edward B. Foley, Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin's Constitution, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 151, 170 (1997).
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clearly be neither perfect nor universally applicable, but there are
some broad principles that would serve as valuable tools in this
developing area of the law.
To justify the application of First Amendment standards to the
(very different) Second Amendment, one must begin by noting the
fact that the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and free
press, as well as the Establishment Clause, incorporated via the
Fourteenth Amendment, 7 are constructed as a restraint on federal
and state governments. The Second Amendment, by contrast, is a
"right of the people," one that secures a specific and individual
liberty. 8 This difference in construction is significant because, as
the Second Circuit has noted, "[tihe Establishment Clause, unlike
the Fourth Amendment, contains no limiting language. Indeed, the
basic structure of the Establishment Clause, which imposes a
restriction on Congress, differs markedly from that of the Fourth
Amendment, which confers a right on the people." 9
This construction is also significant because, as Justice Rehnquist
recently noted:
"[Tihe people" seems to have been a term of art employed in
select parts of the Constitution. The Preamble declares that the
Constitution is ordained and established by "the People of the
United States." The Second Amendment protects "the right of
the people to keep and bear Arms," and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments provide that certain rights and powers are
retained by and reserved to "the people."'
If the phrase "the people" refers to individuals (as it does when used
in the Fourth Amendment) universally, such that individuals' rights
are implicated, then courts and lawmakers should, at the very least,
approach restrictions and infringements on the right to keep and
bear arms with the same caution they show towards such infringe-
ments on the right of free speech and the freedom of the press. To
17. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The Court has not explicitly addressed the
issue of incorporation with respect to the Second Amendment. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS vii-xiii (1998).
18. See U.S. CoNST. amend. II.
19. Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991).
20. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
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do otherwise would be both unconstitutional and intellectually
dishonest.
When deciding Second Amendment cases, at minimum courts
should adopt the varying levels of scrutiny applied in First
Amendment cases in order to afford appropriate deference to the
individual's right to keep and bear arms. Given the fact that such a
fine-tuned construction is applied to a restraint on Congress in the
First Amendment context, surely the Second Amendment which
provides for a more intimate right of "the people" should be offered
the same protection.
B. Legal Scholarship
Legal scholars have arrived at similar conclusions. In dismissing
assertions that the Second Amendment refers to a "collective right,"
Sanford Levinson notes that "[sluch an argument founders ... upon
examination of the text of the federal Bill of Rights itself and the
usage there of the term 'the people' in the First, Fourth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments."21 Another scholar compares the right guar-
anteed by the Second Amendment to that of the people to choose
members of Congress.22 "The significance of guaranteeing the right
to keep and bear arms to 'the people' becomes clear when one reads
the Second Amendment in context with the entire document."23
Leading First Amendment scholars also have recognized the
incongruity of the treatment of the two rights by courts thus far.
Professor William Van Alstyne succinctly summarizes the disparate
treatment:
The Second Amendment of course does not assume that the
right of the people to keep and bear arms will not be abused ....
To put the matter most simply, the governing principle here, in
the Second Amendment, is not different from the same principle
21. Levinson, supra note 1, at 645.
22. Kevin J. Worthen, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in Light of Thornton: The People
and Essential Attributes of Sovereignty, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 137, 146; see U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XVII.
23. T. Markus Funk, Is the True Meaning of the Second Amendment Really SuchaRiddleF
Tracing the Historical 'Origins of an Anglo-American Right,"39 HOWARD L.J. 411,430 (1995)
(reviewing JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMEUCAN RIGHT (1994)).
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governing the First Amendment's provisions on freedom of
speech and the freedom of the press. A person may be held to
account for an abuse of that freedom (for example, by being held
liable for using it to publish false claims with respect to the
nutritional value of the food offered for public sale and
consumption). Yet, no one today contends that just because the
publication of such false statements is a danger one might in
some measure reduce if, say, licenses also could be required as
a condition of owning a newspaper or even a mimeograph
machine, that therefore licensing can be made a requirement of
owning either a newspaper or a mimeograph machine.24
It seems clear that the Second Amendment, because it is a
fundamental right of "the people," ought to be consistent with and
analogous to established First Amendment jurisprudence in the
twenty-first century. As the most celebrated and perhaps the most
extensively developed collection of constitutional rights, the First
Amendment offers numerous, well-developed standards that can be
applied analogously to firearms regulation. In effect, the First
Amendment jurisprudence can serve as a compass to the Court
through the too long uncharted sea of firearms law.
C. The Importance of an Armed Populace in a Free Republic-The
Fundamental Purpose of the Second Amendment and the Miller
Standard
The primary (though not exclusive) purpose of the Second
Amendment's individual right to keep and bear arms, according to
the "standard model," is to ensure an abundance of military power
within the general population on the theory that, although the
government may become tyrannical, the people as a whole never
will. The people must, therefore, retain the ultimate power of the
sword.25 Such an understanding must underlie any decision that
implicates the Second Amendment. Laws that might otherwise be
deemed constitutional must be struck down if they serve to create
24. Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 1250 (footnote omitted).
25. See generally Brian J. McIntosh, The Revolutionary Second Amendment, 51 ALA. L.
REv. 673 (2000).
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a populous that no longer has the power to control its government,
whether such laws relate to firearms or any other matter.
United States v. Miller2 is the only Supreme Court case to deal
directly and exclusively with the Second Amendment. Miller, due to
both its age and lack of a clear holding, is, however, of limited
utility. As Levinson points out, "it is insulting to treat Miller as the
'last word' in interpreting a part of the Bill of Rights, given the
conceptual revolutions that have occurred relative to almost all
other parts of the Bill of Rights since 1939."27 The Miller Court
established the nebulous standard for determining whether a
firearm falls within the scope of the Second Amendment's pro-
tection:
[Unless an arm bears] some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot
say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep
and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that [a sawed-off shotgun] is any part of the ordinary
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the
common defense.2"
This standard is consistent with the "standard model" and the
revolutionary concept in that it requires constitutionally protected
arms to be of military utility.2 9
The implication of the Court's holding in Miller-that arms of
military utility are protected even if the Court did not consider a
short-barreled shotgun such a weapon-is ironic by modern stan-
dards given the recent focus on regulating so-called "assault
weapons," and in light of the severe restrictions that operate on fully
automatic firearms at both the federal and state level.30 The Court
in Miller was forced to infer that a short-barreled shotgun was not
26. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
27. Sanford Levinson, Is the Second Amendment Finally Becoming Recognized as Part of
the Constiution? Voices from the Courts, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REv. 127, 128.
28. Id. at 178 (citation omitted).
29. Kates, supra note 12, at 250 (analyzing the holding in Miller and stating that "[such
arms must be both of the kind in 'common use' at the present time and provably 'part of the
ordinary military equipment') (footnote omitted).
30. Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 1239 n.10 (opining that the Miller standard would
protect the right to keep and bear heavy duty automatic rifles).
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a firearm of military utility because the Court had no independent
knowledge of the guns and because by the time the case was heard,
Miller had died, and so it only heard the government's argument.
Had Miller been present, he might have presented substantial
evidence that compact and even pistol-sized shotguns were used in
combat as far back as the seventeenth century,31 and that shotguns
were used extensively in the trenches during World War I by the
United States-maneuvering in which required a short barrel.32
Bearing in mind the ultimate goal of the Second Amendment and
the standard set forth in Miller, the Court must, at the very least,
interpret the amendment to allow citizens to keep and bear small
arms of military utility, such as those commonly employed by the
current military.33 Both current and historical trends in firearms
regulation have focused on exactly this type of firearm because of
the widely held, though empirically false, perception that criminals
prefer such arms.34
31. THOMAS F. SWEARENGEN, THE WORLD'S FIGHTING SHOTGUNS 2 (1978).
32. See id. at 9 (describing the U.S. War Department's adoption of short-barreled shotguns
as "being most suitable for trench warfare"); see also W. Hay Parks, Joint Service Combat
Shotgun Program, 1997 ARMY LAW. 16, 17 (summarizing the history of the shotgun in
warfare). For examples of pistol-sized shotguns from the colonial era, see CHRISTOPHER
CHANT, ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF SMALL ARMS 10-11 (1996). The fact that Miller did not
appear before the Court to argue this (or any other) point has been noted elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Frank Espohl, The Right to Carry Concealed Weapons For Self.Defense, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151,
156 (1997); Andrew J. McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 53, 100 n.209
(1992).
33. Examples might include the M-16A2 rifle and Beretta M9 pistol, currently issued to
U.S. military personnel. Whether the Second Amendment protects ownership of larger arms,
such as mortars, entails a separate and more difficult analysis that is outside the scope of this
Note.
34. Substantial data indicate that armed criminals overwhelmingly prefer handguns,
generally those that are concealable. See JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. Rossi, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ARMED CRIMINAL IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF INCARCERATED
FELONS 10-11 (1985). It is the very rare criminal indeed who will draw attention to himself
by carrying any type of rifle or shotgun. Military caliber rifles accounted for only 0.8% of
weapons used in homicides in 1990. DAVID KOPEL, GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM 181
(1995). Such data run contrary to statements by lawmakers, such as Senator Dianne
Feinstein, indicating that criminals favor such firearms. See 139 CONG. REC. S9778 (daily ed.
July 29, 1993) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT EVOLVES WITH TECHNOLOGY
A. History and Foundation
Although ratified in 1791 along with the rest of the Bill of Rights,
the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech and a free press
were largely ignored by the Supreme Court until the early twentieth
century.35 The first significant case to announce a clear standard
was Schenck v. United States,6 in which Justice Holmes posited
that even the most expansive reading of the First Amendment's
guarantee of free speech
would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic.... The question in every [free speech] case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.3"
This "clear and present danger" doctrine is one of the cornerstones
of the limitations on the right of free speech, and one that is most
certainly applicable to the regulation of any activity characterized
as a fundamental right in the Constitution that might be exercised
in a manner that could cause public harm.
Near v. Minnesota38 established the prohibition on "prior re-
straints" with respect to the press in 1931. In that case Justice
Hughes, writing for the majority, made the same point that "it has
been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief
purpose of the [First Amendment's free press provision] to prevent
previous restraints upon publication."39 The Court further noted
that this guarantee does "not prevent the subsequent punishment
of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare."' Even
35. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Although
decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, Patterson began the expansion of free speech
rights. Id.
36. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
37. Id. at 52.
38. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
39. Id. at 713.
40. Id. at 714.
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Justice Butler, writing in dissent, stated that "liberty of the press
means simply the absence of restraint upon publication in advance
as distinguished from liability, civil or criminal, for libelous or
improper matter so published.""1
The technological developments of the twentieth century caught
up with the Court when Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927.4'
The Act required that radio broadcasters obtain licenses, ostensibly
to serve the public interest by rationing the scarce resource of
frequencies and preventing their monopolization, in the same way
that government regulates utilities.'3 Lower courts at the time,
interpreting the Act, routinely upheld retaliatory license revocations
that followed the broadcast of material deemed inappropriate by the
Federal Radio Commission" on the theory that an explicit anti-
censorship provision in the Act only prohibited prior restraints.
These courts held that content-based license revocations or
failure to renew were permissible because they were in the public
interest.45
The Supreme Court held in 1943 that the very nature of radio, as
a limited resource of expression, made it subject to regulation of the
sort lower courts had upheld.' The same priciple was later upheld
in Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC.47 Yet radio is not unique in its
scarcity, and this rationale for regulation began to fall out of favor
in the 1980s.4' The Court offered to extend greater freedoms to
broadcasters if the Court received sufficient indications from
Congress or the FCC that new broadcast technologies would make
the "scarcity doctrine" no longer viable as a justification for any
content-based regulations."9 In 1987, in Syracuse Peace Council,'
41. Id. at 735 (Butler, J., dissenting).
42. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162 (repealed 1934).
43. See JONATHAN W. EMORD, FREEDOM, TECHNOLOGY, ANDTHE FItSTAMENDMENT 167-71
(1991).
44. Id. at 175-83.
45. Id.
46. See NatI Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
47. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
48. See Telecomm. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987) (holding that using scarcity alone as a distinguishing factor in
determining whether a medium may be regulated is analytically unsound, as the equipment
needed for virtually all forms of speech and dissemination thereof is scarce).
49. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
50. 2 F.C.C.R. 5043 (1987).
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the FCC effectively reversed the "scarcity doctrine" by acknowl-
edging that "[d lespite the physical differences between the electronic
and print media, their roles in our society are identical, and we
believe that the same First Amendment principles should be equally
applicable to both." 1 Similarly, despite the physical differences that
have developed in the realm of firearms, their normative roles with
respect to the purpose of the Second Amendment are identical, and
remain unchanged since 1791.2
Lower courts have applied a similar rationale to the issue of cable
television outbidding broadcasters for rights to various events and
programs, finding that competition in this arena is no different
constitutionally than that found in newspapers and print media and
so should not be regulated differently. 3 The Supreme Court made
extensive use of technological analogy in a more recent case. In Reno
v. ACLU, 5" the Court compared webpage addresses to telephone
numbers,55 and the entire Internet to a "vast library,"6 ultimately
overturning portions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of
1996"7 because the Act too broadly regulated speech." The Court
held that the internet, as a medium, had none of the characteristics
that have been used to justify stricter regulation of other forms of
media, namely invasiveness and scarcity,59 and therefore applied
basic First Amendment law to the "indecent" speech the "vague"
CDA contemplated, denying Congress the power to prohibit the
publication of this sort of "content.' ° Mere ownership and peaceful
carriage of firearms are actions that, if analyzed in a similar
fashion, lack the invasiveness necessary to justify many of the
infringements on the fundamental right to keep and bear arms that
we see today. Just as the Court has found that modern media is
functionally equivalent to traditional print media of the founding
51. Id. at 5058.
52. See supra Part I.C.
53. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
54. 521 U.S. 844 (1996).
55. Id. at 852.
56. Id. at 853.
57. The Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
58. Reno, 521 U.S. at 885.
59. Id. at 868-70.
60. Id. at 864-66.
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era, so too should it find with respect to modem small arms of
military utility.
The Court clearly is capable of drawing technological analogies
and distinctions and applying or adapting standards from diverse
areas of the law. Even more revealing is the fact that the Court has
analogized new communication technologies to old ones, accepting
that the new technologies serve the same role in society as the
oldest and deserve analogous protection. So too must the Court
recognize that modern military firearms serve the same role with
respect to the Second Amendment that the muskets of 1791 served
at that time. The Court has all but ignored the evolution of small
arms from the time of the musket to time of the today's machine
gun, while carefully continuing to protect speech even as communi-
cation has become more and more technologically accomplished.
This is troublesome both practically and idealogically.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL ARMS
Almost all adherents to the "standard model" of the Second
Amendment agree that the model protects owning those arms that
may be both carried and employed (i.e., fired) by an individual.6' For
the purposes of this Note, such arms will be defined as "small arms."
The purpose of this Part is to provide some background and
historical reference on the development of small arms to demon-
strate that the Court has had ample time and opportunity to
contemplate and deal with the development of these firearm
technologies, and to show that most "modem" firearms are, in fact,
a century old.
Various forms of what could be considered small arms have
existed since at least 1000 A.D.62 when the Chinese developed
gunpowder, although the existence of weapons of military design
utilizing such a propellant was not documented until the early four-
teenth century.63 The fiftbenth century witnessed the introduction
61. See Kates, supra note 12, at 219-20. Whether the Second Amendment secures a right
to keep and bear larger arms is a contentious issue and one that is beyond the scope of this
Note.
62. CHANT, supra note 32, at 6.
63. Id. at 7.
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of the rifled barrel in Europe" allowing for far greater accuracy than
the existing matchlock firearms of the era.65 After the matchlock
came the more familiar flintlock firearm (employing a flint striker
to generate sparks rather than a "match") that became the standard
small arm of the late 1600s.' This era also witnessed some of the
first attempts to develop repeating arms, including the revolver67
and the "Puckle Gun," the forerunner to the Civil War-era "Gatling
Gun,"' patented by James Puckle in 1718.69
Although both manufacturing techniques and military tactics
evolved during the period, the colonial era saw relatively few
technological advancements worth noting.7 ° It was not until the
invention of an effective percussion cap in the early 1800s that
small arms technology began to accelerate.7' The year 1836 saw the
introduction of the revolver rifle, a percussion cap rifle that could
fire five shots in rapid succession via five revolving, individually
capped chambers, which led to the famous and more successful Colt
revolver pistol of late-nineteenth-century fame.72 The percussion cap
also paved the way for modem self-contained metallic cartridges, as
it allowed bullet, powder, and priming charge to become one unit.
The Civil War Era saw the introduction of the metallic cartridges
that remain, from a basic technological perspective, essentially
unchanged today.73 These cartridges, however, were not widely used
until after the Civil War. They allowed for both load consistency and
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 8-9. The "matchlock" was a method of igniting the gunpowder propellant. A
slow-burning piece of hemp cord soaked in chemicals would be mounted to a springloaded
arm, and activation of the trigger would swing the arm and the "match" onto a small pile of
powder above a hole, charging the powder within the gun's barrel.
66. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 11 (describing John Dafte's snaphaunce revolver, circa 1680).
68. See infra note 82.
69. For a description and history of the Puckle Gun, see Quick-Firing Revolver Gun, at
http://dld.mk.dmu.ac.uk/Heritage/htn/tour/revolverinfo.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
70. CHANT, supra note 32, at 10-12.
71. A percussion cap is a small container (shaped like a thimble, but one-third to one-half
the size) that contains a compound that will detonate when violently struck. Alexander
Forsyth of Scotland is widely credited with creating the first "percussion cap" made of paper.
Although the metal caps were developed later are still used today by reenactors and
hobbyists. See CHANT, supra note 32, at 13.
72. Id. at 16.
73. Cartridges analagous to modem shotgun ammunition were developed in France in
1857, and those analagous to modern centerfire rifle and pistol cartridges in 1861. Id. at 20.
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the development of more sophisticated repeating firearms, the first
of which were simple "breech loading" (rear loading, as opposed to
"muzzle loading") firearms in the 1870s, followed soon after by bolt
action rifles.74 The box magazine, a now familiar ammunition
feeding device, was introduced in 1879 by James Lee to create a
repeating bolt action rifle. 7
5
Blackpowder was a final technological hurdle to be overcome.
Such powder created enormous clouds of smoke on the battlefield
when discharged from a firearm, immediately revealing the position
of an otherwise hidden soldier. It was also difficult to use in longer
barrels due to its fast burn rate. 7 A Frenchman named Paul Vielle
finally solved these problems by creating modem smokeless powder
in 1884, used universally today in modem firearm cartridges.77
American Hiram Maxim was the pioneer of automatic firearms.
As early as 1884 he had a functional, though clumsy and unreliable,
semiautomatic rifle that operated by using some of the rifle's recoil
energy to operate a system of springs and levers.78 Maxim went on
to develop the first true machine gun in 18857' and developed a gas-
operated semiautomatic rifle by 1 8 9 1 .s' Legendary gunmaker John
74. Small Arms, at http'J/www.historychannel.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
75. CHANT, supra note 32, at 26. The box magazine was simply a spring-loaded container
that sat beneath the bolt of the rifle and fed metallic cartridges one at a time as one operated
the rifle. Modern bolt action rifles often employ the same mechanism, while autoloading
firearms often used a detachable box magazine that can be quickly replaced with a fully
loaded one. Such magazines have become the subject of numerous regulations, including the
1994 federal "assault weapons" ban, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 (2000), which restricts the
possession of magazines holding more than ten cartridges (that were manufactured or
imported after its effective date) to law enforcement and military users.
76. See CHANT, supra note 32, at 36. Blackpowder burns faster than modem smokeless
powder designed for longer barrels, and excessive pressure from the powder can lead to an
explosive failure of the musket, resulting in injury, burns, and even death of the operator.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 40. "Semiautomatic" refers to a firearm that fires a single shot, then reloads the
firing chamber automatically (but does not fire an additional shot until the trigger is released
and pressed again), unlike a "fully automatic" firearm or machine gun that will continue to
fire repeatedly as long as the trigger is held back.
79. John H. Lienhard, Engines of our Engenuity, No. 694: Hiram Maxim (NPR radio
broadcast), transcript available at httpJ/www.uh.edu/engines/epi694.htm (last visited Jan.
7, 2003).
80. CHANT, supra note 32, at 40. "Gas-operated" firearms function by siphoning a small
amount of the tremendous gas pressure generated inside the barrel during firing and using
this pressure to open and close the bolt of the gun (thereby ejecting the fired metallic cartridge
case and loading a new one from a spring-loaded magazine). This is the same type of mech-
anism used by modern military firearms, including the M-16 and AK-47 rifles. Id. at 132-34.
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Browning developed a gas-operated machine gun around the same
time.8 Although small arms in effect capable of automatic fire were
developed and briefly used during the Civil War,82 Maxim's machine
guns were the first to employ a single barrel and a truly self-loading
mechanism.83 Today, most machine guns and military rifles,
depending on their caliber and role, employ either gas operation,
some form of recoil operation, or a motorized "Gatling Gun"
mechanism.84
The application of self-loading mechanisms to handguns was
proposed as early as 1864,85 but cleaner smokeless powder and
metallic cartridges allowed such firearms to truly develop in the
1890s. Perhaps the best known, though not the first, design of the
era is that of John Browning, whose 1898 model would lead to the
development of the famous M1911.45 caliber pistol adopted by and
used extensively by the U.S. Army from 1911 until 1985,86 and still
widely used today, essentially unchanged in ninety years, by
military and law enforcement personnel as well as private citizens.
Browning also patented the first semi-automatic shotgun in 1900.87
Today, almost all military and many sporting small arms use the
gas or recoil operated auto-loading mechanisms developed more
than a century ago.8s The current trend in military small arms is
81. John Moses Browning (1855-1926), at http://www.ml911.org/full-browning.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2003).
82. Dr. Richard J. Gatling is famous for inventing and marketing his "Gatling Gun"
during the Civil War. See Gatling Gun, at http://www.historychannel.com (last visited Apr.
2, 2003).
83. Maxim's guns relied on the energy of the firing cartridge to cycle the action of the gun,
rather than on an operator manually turning a lever as with the Gatling guns. Maxim's
development enabled the operator to aim and fire the weapon more effectively at the same
time while making the system more compact, both essential for the use of such an action in
a rifle carried by a single person. See Hiram Maxim, at http://www.spartacus. schoolnet.co.uk
(last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
84. See CHANT, supra note 32, at 59-87.
85. Id. at 53.
86. Id. at 55. Colt produced this pistol for the military, creating the "Colt .45," the name
often associated with this Browning design.
87. Browning's Historical Timeline 1855-2002, at http://www.browning.comservices/
compinfo/timeline.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
88. For examples of military firearms, see CHANT, supra note 32, at 96-135.
Semiautomatic sporting and hunting guns of all kinds have been marketed since John
Browning developed his shotgun in 1900 and they remain popular today. For examples of such
guns, see the Remington website, at http://www.remington.com (last visited Jan. 7, 2003) and
the Ruger website, at http://www.ruger.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
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toward weapons that use lighter ammunition, enable a single
soldier to carry more cartridges, have greater effective accuracy, and
have the ability to defeat enemies hiding behind cover. 9
Given the evolution of firearm technology since 1791 and the lack
of Supreme Court guidance in interpreting the Second Amendment,
First Amendment standards announced by the Court and applied to
rapidly advancing media and communications technologies are the
most logical place to look to begin to interpret the right to keep and
bear arms of modern design.
IV. APPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS TO THE
SECOND AMENDMENT
This Note has shown the capacity of law to develop along with
technology in the First Amendment context, 90 and illustrated that
Second Amendment jurisprudence has not matched the advance-
ment in small arms technology since the days of the musket or even
the short-barreled shotgun in Miller.91 The next step is to detail
First Amendment doctrines that are appropriate and available for
application to Second Amendment issues. The Note will apply these
concepts to the 1994 federal "assault weapons" ban,92 and the
National Firearms Act of 1934,"3 with reference to other common
89. See Memorandum of Law-Review of Weapons in the Advanced Combat Rifle Program,
1990 ARMY LAW. 18 (describing the military's desire to field a rifle capable of a one hundred
percent hit rate at three hundred meters and some of the technology being considered to
achieve this goal); Paul Eng, A Smarter Rifle: Advanced Technology May Give Foot Soldiers
a Fighting Edge, ABC NEws.COM, Sept. 28, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/
CuttingEdgelsmartrifle0lO926.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003) (describing the "Objective
Individual Combat Weapon," scheduled to be in use by 2010, which uses a plethora of new
technologies to increase accuracy and place grenade rounds with pinpoint accuracy).
90. See supra Part II.
91. Compare supra Part III (providing history of small arms), with Part I.C (discussing
Miller and the dearth of Second Amendment review since 1939). The Supreme Court has,
however, had ample opportunity to decide Second Amendment cases. See U.S. v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 218-36 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002) (reviewing two "collective
rights" models from other circuits and adhering instead to the "standard mode," thus creating
a three-way circuit split); see also Love v. Peppersack, 47 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 813 (1995); Quilici v. Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 863 (1983). See generally Ronald Beason, Printz Punts on the Palladium of Rights: It is
Time to Protect the Right of the Individual to Keep and BearArms, 50 ALA. L. REV. 561,580-81
(1999).
92. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 (2000).
93. National Firearms Act of 1934, 26 U.S.C. § 5801-5850 (2000).
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methods of regulation. These particular federal laws, and their ever-
changing state-level counterparts, are of particular interest in light
of the Miller standard discussed earlier.
The Court has announced various sorts of limitations on the
government's power to limit speech and the press. The First
Amendment doctrines that seem to be most applicable to the realm
of firearms regulation are those of: (1) prior restraints; (2) time,
place, and manner restrictions; (3) protection of minors; (4)
"secondary effects"; and (5) national security.
A. Prior Restraints
The Court has held that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity."94 The concept established in the Near
case95 is one of the oldest in First Amendment jurisprudence, and
stems from law as old as Blackstone's Commentaries.W
Perhaps more relevant to the issue at hand is the portion of
Justice Hughes' opinion in Near in which he states: "The fact that
the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the
press from previous restraint .... Subsequent punishment for such
abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with
constitutional privilege."7 Simply put, the presumption against
prior restraints is "deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to
punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law
than to throttle them and all others beforehand." 8
The prohibition of prior restraints, a prohibition that the Court
has upheld zealously in First Amendment cases in all but the most
dire circumstances," is perhaps the most important principle that
Second Amendment law should take from First Amendment law.
Many forms of firearms regulation would be found facially
94. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (citations omitted).
95. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
96. See id. at 713-14 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52).
97. Id. at 720.
98. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis
omitted). For a general treatment of the law of prior restraints, see Thomas I. Emerson, The
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
99. See infra Part IV.E (discussing national security matters).
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unconstitutional if this standard were applied. It is curious that
the Court has not analyzed a myriad of state and federal laws
amounting to prior restraints on the exercise of the right to keep
and bear arms, though they have treated free speech and press so
extensively.
If one applies the prior restraint reasoning of Near" to the
plethora of modem firearms laws, it becomes clear that an entire
class of firearms laws, both state and federal, criminalize behavior
that is, in and of itself, harmless and thus such prohibitions are
unconstitutional prior restraints. 10' Such laws are based on the
theory that the proscribed act is done in preparation for the
commission of another crime, such as armed robbery or murder," 2
or that certain classes of firearms have no "legitimate" purpose.0"
Laws prohibiting or severely restricting the possession of fully-
automatic and semiautomatic firearms, or any other category of
militarily useful small arm, are prime examples of laws that ought
to be viewed as presumptively unconstitutional. Such laws act as
"prior restraints" on citizens' exercise of the right to keep and bear
arms. This right should certainly protect the ownership and carriage
of such firearms because (1) the right is applicable to individuals
and (2) the right exists today for the same purposes that the
Framers envisioned. 10 4
100. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
101. Mere possession or peaceful carrying of firearms, for example, regardless of their type,
seems harmless. In fact, there is significant empirical evidence indicating that carriage of
firearms by the general public may deter crime. See, e.g., JOHN R. Lovr, JR., MoRE GuNs, LEss
CRME (1998) (finding that states that enacted laws allowing law-abiding citizens to carry
concealed handguns experienced significant reductions in crime).
102. One example, New York's "Sullivan Law," requiring a license to purchase or own a
handgun and prohibiting carry of such firearms, has been in place since 1911. Sullivan Law,
ch. 195, 1911 N.Y Laws 422 (1911) (cited in Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, 'Never
Intended to be Applied to the White Population': Firearms Regulation and Racial
Disparity-The Redeemed South's Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI. KENT L. REv.
1307, 1334 n.170 (1995)).
103. So-called "assault weapons" and fully automatic firearms have been referred to by
lawmakers as having no "legitimate purpose," despite their clear military utility of the sort
due protection under the Second Amendment in accordance with the Miller principle. For
example, then Congressman Charles Schumer stated in 1995 that "assault weapons have no
legitimate purpose." Schumer, Brewster Disagree on Amendment, Assault Rifles (CNN
television broadcast, Jan. 27, 1995).
104. See supra Part I.C (discussing the standard model).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Faced with such doctrines, the Court should reason that persons
who, for example, own machine guns or "assault weapons," are still
liable, criminally and civilly, for both their willful and negligently
harmful acts arising from the ownership and carriage of such
firearms. These doctrines, however, also dictate that the Court
conclude that laws that deny entirely or substantially interfere with
the mere ownership and carriage of such firearms violate the Second
Amendment's guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms of
military utility.
B. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Historically, the Court has recognized that, although the exercise
of the right of free speech is a fundamental right, certain regulation
of the time, place, and manner of such exercise may be consti-
tutional, provided that the restrictions are not motivated by the
content of the speech itself and the regulations are narrowly tailored
to effect the government's compelling interest.10 5
In general, the government may control the manner in which
speech is conducted only so long as there is some compelling
governmental interest."° The Court has held, for example, that
government may prohibit broadcasting via loudspeakers on trucks
due to the disruptive nature of the noise, but may not regulate
because of the content of the speech.'0 7 The mere possibility of
disruption or eyesore, however, is not sufficient reason to prohibit
105. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (holding that a city may
regulate demonstrations outside of schools to minimize the impact of noise on the schools,
provided that such regulations are narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest of
avoiding disruption of education); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) ("The rights of
free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean that
everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at
any time."); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (holding that the government may
decline to give a marching permit in order to prevent more than one parade from marching
on a street at the same time).
106. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17.
107. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding a Trenton, New Jersey law
prohibiting the use of "speaker trucks" on public roads). But see Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948) (striking down a similar Lockport, New York law because it left the decision as to
whether to allow the use of such trucks to the discretion of the police chief).
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otherwise protected speech. °8 Time, place, and manner restrictions
are subjected to less than strict scrutiny precisely because they
ultimately allow the speech.
How might these cases be applied to the Second Amendment?
Both state and federal laws already proscribe the possession and
carriage of firearms in numerous places and often the manner in
which they may be carried."° Application of First Amendment
standards, however, would likely result in the overturning of
numerous laws of this type, particularly if the Court were to apply
the Cohen standard:" 0 The government would have to show that the
damage to the rights of others resulting from mere possession is so
intolerable that the restriction is justified."' To prohibit the mere
possession or the peaceful carriage of modern firearms is to tell Paul
Robert Cohen that merely displaying his four letter word is
unconstitutional." "While the four-letter word displayed by Cohen
in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally
provocative fashion, in this instance it was clearly not 'directed
to the person of the hearer.'" ' The analogy to firearms is clear:
firearms are frequently used in a provocative fashion, yet like
words, guns are often harmless. Still, many jurisdictions would not
108. The Court has held:
The purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to
justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from
handing literature to one willing to receive it .... This constitutional protection
does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering. There are obvious
methods of preventing littering. Amongst these is the punishment of those who
actually throw papers on the streets.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939).
109. For example, federal law prohibits the carry of firearms in or on the property of
schools, and prescribes the manner in which they must be carried near such areas. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(q) (2000). The Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990, 20 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988) was
overturned by the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), because of
Congress' insufficient factual findings. It was subsequently reenacted by Congress with
accompanying findings of fact. Act of Sept. 30, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-369
(codified as amended 18 U.S.C. 922(q) (2000)). Every state has laws regulating the carriage
of firearms, particularly handguns, in public. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-308 to -311
(Michie 2001). Many states require that one produce evidence of a compelling reason (e.g.,
death threats or dangerous occupation) to be permitted to carry a firearm in public, and some
require permits merely to purchase firearms. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C58-3 (West 1995).
110. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 21.
113. Id. at 20 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
allow Cohen to wear a gun in the same way that he may wear his
dirty word. Members of the public might be alarmed by the sight of
a gun in public, yet the Court in Cohen was quite clear. The
presence of "unwitting listeners or viewers" is simply not a good
enough reason to proscribe a constitutionally protected activity. 114
C. The Protection of Minors
Governments have a compelling interest in protecting minors," 5
and the Court has recognized that "the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults ...,116 Furthermore, considering restrictions on the
access of minors to indecent materials, the Court has applied a
rational basis standard to determine whether those restrictions are
constitutional, rather than the usual strict scrutiny reserved for the
fundamental right of free speech."' Indeed, the state has broad
powers in protecting minors, but these powers are not unlimited
despite the "rational basis" standard that the Court typically
applies.
Despite giving great deference to the judgments of lawmakers
regarding laws protecting minors, the Court has ruled that such
laws must be tailored so as not to, in effect, place the same
restrictions on the adult population when the justification for the
law is to protect minors."l8 Such laws must be constructed so as to
achieve the state's goal of protecting minors from the evil in
question without effectively infringing on the rights of adults."9
The state interest in protecting the welfare of minors is quite
clear. Both state and federal restrictions on the sale of firearms to
minors and the possession of firearms by minors' 2° are, thus,
consistent with the Second Amendment as a fundamental right,
114. Id. at 21.
115. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982).
116. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
117. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,641-43 (1968).
118. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (holding that laws aimed at protecting
children from objectionable materials may not "reduce the adult population ... to reading only
what is fit for children").
119. Id. at 383.
120. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(b) (2000) (prohibiting the sale of firearms to minors under
the age of eighteen and prohibiting the sale of handguns to those under twenty-one).
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even if one employs the strictest scrutiny applied to some classes of
speech and media expression protected by the First Amendment.
There is most certainly a rational basis for such laws given the
potential dangers of allowing minors to buy firearms of any type,
and such laws would likely survive more strict scrutiny as well.
The rights of minors with respect to free speech are not equiv-
alent to those of adults.'21 Yet key to the government's relatively
broad powers to protect minors is that such laws, though due great
deference, must not "burn the house to roast the pig."'22 Many
firearms laws that apply to adults are ostensibly meant, in part, to
protect minors from the dangers of firearms.'23 Bans on "assault
weapons," for example, though often more concerned with the
military appearance of certain firearms, are partially motivated by
the desire to protect children.'24 Such laws, however, are not in line
with the reasoning in Butler as applied to the Second Amendment.
In Butler, the state of Michigan attempted to justify its anti-
obscenity law-ban the sale of obscene materials to persons of any
age-by citing the material's tendency to corrupt the morals of the
youth, 2 ' but the Court stated that "[wie have before us legislation
not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to deal."126
Similarly, attempts to restrict the access of adults to
constitutionally protected firearms under the guise of protecting
minors should be struck down as overly broad as well. Abuse of the
right to keep and bear arms that results in harm to children is
legally indistinguishable from the harm resulting from otherwise
protected speech, or from categories of speech that may be regulated
121. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638.
122. Butler, 352 U.S. at 383.
123. The Brady Campaign, for example, one of the leading gun control lobbying groups,
highlights the impact of irresponsible gun ownership on children as a justification for further
regulation of adult ownership of firearms. See The Brady Campaign, Kids and Guns Issue
Brief America, at http'J/www.bradycampaign.org/facts (last visited Apr. 2, 2003).
124. The first "assault weapons" ban passed in the United States, California's "Roberti-
Roos" Law, was motivated by a schoolyard shooting in Stockton, California. The California
state legislature passed and signed the law within a few months of the incident. See
California Leads the Way, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1989, at Metro 8.
125. Butler, 352 U.S. at 380-81.
126. Id. at 383; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 ("[Wle have repeatedly recognized the
governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials. But that interest does
not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.") (citations
omitted).
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narrowly as to prevent minors' exposure to it. An adult who harms
a child by displaying pornographic material may be punished, just
as he may be punished if the harm is inflicted with a firearm, but
mere possibilities do not justify an entirely prohibitive law. There
is, of course, a significant difference between the extent of the harm
that may befall a child in each case, but the greater harm that may
be inflicted by abuse of the right to keep and bear arms should be,
and already is, reflected in the greater penalties imposed by the
criminal law to punish and deter such acts.
D. Secondary Effects
States and municipalities have successfully regulated communi-
cation that might otherwise be afforded protection under the First
Amendment by regulating the "secondary effects" of some speech or
its method of conveyance (such as traffic problems, urban decay, or
the moral character of neighborhoods).' 27 The justification for such
regulations stems from their ostensible purposes, such as alleviating
problems of urban decay. Such laws have survived the scrutiny of
the courts by not completely prohibiting the speech itself, but rather
regulating the speech by way of content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions.
The Court has generally been fairly deferential to the judgments
of governments in their attempts to regulate "secondary effects,"
requiring only minimal cause and effect evidence and demon-
strations that the regulation will alleviate the problem(s).12 The
127. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding a Detroit
.skid row" ordinance prohibiting adult theaters from operating within 1000 feet of one
another, ostensibly to control crime and other undesirable activities that occur in proximity
to these theaters). But see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking
down a Jacksonville, Florida ordinance that prohibited the display of films containing nudity
at drive-in movie screens visible from roadways. The Court reasoned that the film itself, not
the nudity, distracted motorists and that the law therefore was unconstitutional, as it was
aimed at content directly rather than media secondary effects.).
128. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a Renton,
Washington ordinance regulating the location of adult business, despite very little study of
the effects of such businesses within the city); Young, 427 U.S. at 71 & n.34 (upholding a
Detroit zoning regulation with only reference to the "Common Council's" finding of
deterioration). But see Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 222 F.3d 719 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that the city did not meet its factual burden in establishing a nexus between
adult businesses and the secondary effects that it sought to abate).
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Court in Renton developed, and the Ninth Circuit has clarified, a
three step test for analyzing such regulations:
We first must determine whether the ordinance is a"time, place,
and manner regulation[]." If it is, we must then determine
whether it is content-neutral or content-based. If we decide that
the ordinance is content-neutral, we must then determine
whether the proposed ordinance "is designed to serve a
substantial government interest and allows for reasonable
alternative avenues of communication. " "
The requirement that "reasonable alternative avenues of com-
munication" remain available despite regulation reflects the
fundamental purposes of the free speech right. This consideration
will be important, perhaps decisive, in applying the "secondary
effects" rationale to firearms regulation. If a law proscribes the
keeping and bearing of suitable arms, whether entirely through de
facto prohibition or effectively through cumbersome regulation and
restriction, it will not satisfy the reasoning of Renton insofar as such
a law does not allow for reasonable alternatives through which the
right may be exercised.
Although states and municipalities have tried and failed to
regulate adults' access to obscenity by using their power to protect
minors, they have succeeded in many of their attempts to control
and reduce the display of obscenity by targeting the purveyors of
obscenity based on the "secondary effects" of the businesses. The
regulation of obscenity has become of even greater legal significance
in the age of television and the Internet. Might such a "secondary
effects" justification validate regulations on firearms, and more
specifically, "assault weapons" and those firearms affected by the
National Firearms Act of 1934?
First, the "secondary effects" justification, despite the relatively
small burden that the government must bear in showing a nexus
between the regulated activity and the "secondary effect(s)," cannot
serve as a basis to prohibit entirely certain speech."3 If one
characterizes the "assault weapons" ban and the National Firearms
129. Tollis, Inc. v. San Bernardino County, 827 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting
Renton, 475 U.S. at 41) (additional citation omitted).
130. Id. at 1329.
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Act of 1934 as based on the "secondary effects"-the criminal misuse
of the firearms, or the illicit activities purportedly associated with
them such as robbery, gang activity, and drug trade-both laws in
their current form should fall under scrutiny similar to that applied
in Tollis.13
1
The "assault weapons" ban completely prohibits the manufacture
and import of an entire category of constitutionally protected
firearms and ammunition feeding devices, and cannot be char-
acterized as a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction that
allows for an alternative exercise of the right to keep and bear arms
of military utility. Although continued possession and (in most
states) transfer of existing "assault weapons" remains legal, the long
term effect of the law is to allow such firearms to "die off gradually,
resulting in a loss of the power of the sword within the general
population-exactly the scenario the Framers feared.
The "assault weapons" ban has been widely, and correctly,
characterized as "cosmetic" because it does not actually ban fire-
arms because of their semi-automatic function (as most semi-
automatic firearms are left unaffected) but rather because of certain
features that do not affect the firearm's accuracy, rate of fire, or
lethality, but have utility in military service. 13 2 The construction of
the law appears to do little of practical value to curb the "firepower"
of criminals, making it all the more troublesome given its goal
of restricting public access to precisely those types of firearms
protected by the Second Amendment and the Miller standard.13
The construction of the federal "assault weapons" ban falls neatly
within the reasoning in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville.'" The
Court in Erznoznik reasoned that display of any film on a screen
near roadways might distract drivers, and that the prohibition of
displaying films containing nudity at such venues was clearly a
content-based restriction. 3 The Assault Weapons Ban allows the
131. See id.
132. For a discussion ofthe "cosmetic" nature of"assault weapon" bans, see David B. Kopel,
Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon" Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381 (1994).
Banned features such as flash suppressors would have little or no effect on a firearm's
propensity to be misused criminally, but would have great utility on a constitutionally
protected military arm.
133. See supra Part I.C.
134. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
135. Id. at 211.
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continued manufacture and import of firearms that are functionally
identical with respect to their capability of being misused by
criminals and minors to those that are banned. A ban on "assault
weapons" that attacks only design features that are purely of
military utility (such as flash suppressors and bayonet mounts) and
are not substantially relevant in any way to the ability of such
firearms to be misused by criminals, would run afoul of the Second
Amendment if a standard analogous to the First Amendment
standard was applied.
The National Firearms Act of 1934 began as a simple taxation
scheme on fully automatic firearms and rifles, and shotguns with
short barrels, that may very well have been constitutional to begin
with.' It was amended in 1986, however, to completely ban the
further manufacture and import of fully automatic firearms for
consumption by the public. Only the military and law enforcement
may purchase newly manufactured fully automatic firearms."3 7
Applying the Tollis standard to the National Firearms Act, it is
quite clear that there is no alternative method of exercising the
right to keep and bear arms of military utility (in this case, fully
automatic small arms similar to those in current military service).
Though it might be argued that firearms substantially similar to
"assault weapons" remain legal for civilian consumption, 138 there is
no such argument to be made in the case of the National Firearms
Act. Military and law enforcement agencies may purchase fully
automatic firearms and carry them with few restrictions, while
the private citizen may not.3 9 The effective prohibition on the
ownership and carriage of small arms of military utility that has
136. National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934).
137. Firearm Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (amending
18 U.S.C. § 921 (1968)) (prohibiting the further manufacture and import of fully automatic
firearms, except for use by military and law enforcement).
138. So-called "post-ban" firearms remain in legal production, as the offending features
(usually flash suppressor, bayonet mount, and collapsible stock) may be removed, resulting
in a similar firearm that retains the semiautomatic operation of the banned firearms. See, e.g.,
PCR/AR Kits, available at http:/Avww.olyarms.com/pcrkits.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2003)
(offering a selection of "Politically Correct Rifles").
139. It remains legal at the federal level to purchase and possess fully automatic firearms
imported or manufactured before 1986. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2000). The process required to
obtain one is lengthy and expensive, and due to the relatively small number of
"grandfathered" firearms remaining in circulation, prices often reach five figures for a used
firearm that the military or law enforcement agencies could purchase new for less than $1000.
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emerged as a result of the "assault weapons" ban and the National
Firearms Act of 1934 "throws the baby out with the bathwater." In
their ostensible attempts to reduce the firepower of a very small
percentage of criminals, 140 and to prevent a statistically insignificant
number of deaths of children, 141 our government has simply created
a necessary condition of tyranny. Congress, through these laws, has
largely monopolized the power of the sword by creating a sub-
stantial disparity between the arms that may be carried by the
government and those that may be held by private citizens; this
state of affairs directly violates the Second Amendment because it
directly frustrates one of its primary purposes.
E. National Security
The Court has not often ruled on the manners in which the
government may engage in censorship to protect national security
nor on the burden the government must meet to justify these
regulations. The doctrine of separation of powers is the focus of
much of the case law dealing with national security, rather than
individual rights. 42 Nonetheless, the related First Amendment law
that has developed in this area may prove useful in establishing
whether and to what degree a government may use national
security as ajustification to regulate firearms. This justification has
been suggested in the context of firearms regulation in the United
States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,143 and
140. See Kopel, supra note 132. Kopel found that in 1990, only 0.8% of homicides involved
military caliber rifles, and "assault weapons" are an even smaller subset of all rifles of these
calibers. Id. at 410. Kopel also looked at FBI and local police data and found that, of the 1534
police officers killed by firearms between 1975 and 1992, only sixteen (or about one percent)
were killed by firearms that meet the California state law definition of an "assault weapon."
Id. at 410-11. Whether the use of an "assault weapon" was a decisive factor in any of these
incidents is also unclear, because the vast majority of shootings involved only a few shots. See
GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 79 (1991).
141. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTBOOK (1997) (finding that in 1997
accidental gunfire killed 142 children nationwide under the age of fourteen).
142. See generally DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW (3d ed. 2002).
143. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Senate Approves Feinstein Provisions
That Make it More Difficult for Terrorists to Obtain Weapons from the United States (Dec.
21, 2001), available at http'//www.senate.gov/-feinstein/releases0l/weapons.htm (lastvisited
Apr. 2, 2003).
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world leaders and organizations such as the U.N. have cited
national security as a justification for small arms control.'"
The Court in Near noted an exception to the prohibition on prior
restraints, stating that "[n]o one would question but that a govern-
ment might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or
the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and
location of troops." 45 In upholding an indictment for distributing
anti-draft materials during World War I, the Court applied the
"clear and present danger" doctrine, noting:
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems
to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting
service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect
might be enforced.1"
Speech that has the actual and direct effect of compromising or
undermining national security does not enjoy the same broad
protection as other forms of speech. Still, as the Court noted in New
York Times Co. v. United States,'47 the government's case for an
injunction on the publication of sensitive materials in the press
must not rest upon "surmise or conjecture that untoward con-
sequences may result.""' There must be more than a mere, or even
strong, possibility that national security will be compromised, before
a prior restraint on speech is justified. "Thus, only governmental
allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the
issuance of an interim restraining order." 9
144. JACQUELINE SECK, WEST AFRICA SMALL ARMs MORATORIUM: HIGH-LEVEL
CONSULTATIONS ON THE MODALTIES FORTHE IMPLEMENTATION OF PCASED, SUMMARY (2000),
available at httpA/www.unidir.ch/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-000-1-en.pdf (last visited Apr.
2, 2003); see also ROBERT J. SPITZER, THE POLITICS OF GUN CONTROL 142-53 (2d ed. 1998).
145. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (footnote omitted).
146. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
147. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725-26 (1971).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 726-27.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The high burden that the government must meet often is very
important, particularly as one moves from the abstract application
of these elements to the Second Amendment to an examination of
empirical data related to gun control and the misuse of firearms.
The Court in New York Times repeated its admonition in Near
that although the government may not place prior restraints on the
press, the press is still liable criminally and civilly for the harmful
results and content of their publications. 50 Among the paramount
purposes of the First Amendment, according to the Court in New
York Times, is to keep the government honest; this sometimes
requires unfettered publication of damaging documents.' "The
guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of
informed representative government provides no real security for
our Republic." 52
Keeping the government "honest" is one important function of the
First Amendment; it is the most important purpose of the Second.
The government might argue that a reduction in arms held by
private parties is a compelling national security interest, an ironic
position in light of the very purpose of the Second Amendment."15
The security of the nation and the Constitution are precisely what
the Amendment addresses, and the security of a tyrannical
government is not a compelling interest. Indeed, the prevention of
tyranny is a fundamental purpose embedded in the structure of our
federal government. In order for the Amendment to function as the
Framers intended in such a scenario, a very large percentage of the
armed population (and probably the active military as well) would
have to arrive at a consensus that the government is no longer
acting legitimately. 54
150. Id. at 734-37 (White, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 719.
153. McIntosh, supra note 25, at 710-11.
154. See generally David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The
Terrifying Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 614 (1991) (suggesting that the right to
keep and bear arms is individual in nature, but necessarily collective in its function, as both
the armed citizenry and the National Guard would have to act in modem times).
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CONCLUSION
The foundation and analysis presented in this Note are merely a
beginning, a concept upon which to build further analogies in order
to bring sound reason to the Second Amendment in the age of
modern weaponry. The Second Amendment, as a right of "the
people" and one that preserves a right that is at the very foundation
of a free nation, deserves the same nuanced analysis as the First
Amendment and the same attention of the courts. It must be read
with its true purpose in mind, just as the First Amendment is.
Restrictions on the exercise of the right to bear arms must be
narrowly tailored, use the least restrictive means possible, and be
justified by a compelling state interest. Restrictions relevant to
minors and time, place, and manner might be constitutional
provided that they are crafted to meet these standards already in
place with respect to the First Amendment. The regulations must
also preserve reasonable alternative methods of exercise of the
Second Amendment right and not erode the power of revolutionary
deterrence that the right preserves.
The exercise of the right to keep and bear arms, like the exercise
of the right to free speech and press, is not unlimited and, by its
very nature, may cause great harm. Libel, slander, obscenity, and
release of national secrets can also do so, and the latter may result
in many deaths. Yet the Court has rightly been careful to preserve
the free exercise of the rights of speech and press despite these
hazards. These are the costs that a free society must bear, costs that
are ultimately outweighed by both the greater security and the
intrinsic good that each of these rights provides. Courts must thus
review laws restricting the right to keep and bear arms with the
same level of scrutiny afforded analogous intrusions upon other
individual rights. Viewed in this light, many existing firearm laws
would not pass constitutional muster. The federal "assault weapons"
ban and the National Firearms Act of 1934 are excellent examples
of legislation that the Supreme Court must address and strike
down by applying the same levels of scrutiny as it does in First
Amendment cases.
The First Amendment provides a well-developed and readily
adaptable framework for examining the Second Amendment as
an individual constitutional right. If one accepts that the Second
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Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms of
military utility, then the Second Amendment deserves treatment
parallel to that the First receives. Laws that constructively (through
manufacturing bans) or directly prohibit the possession and
peaceful carrying of arms of military utility run afoul of the Second
Amendment unless they are justified and limited by doctrines at
least as carefully drawn as those of the First Amendment. It is time
for the Court to direct its attention to this long neglected stepchild
of the Bill of Rights and apply its well-reasoned First Amendment
standards to the Second Amendment.
David G. Browne
